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                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________________ 
 
Nos. 12-2839 & 13-1446 
___________________ 
 
LAILA RAJABI, 
                         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
                                              Respondent 
 
___________________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA-1 No. A074-761-909 
Immigration Judge: The Honorable Robert P. Owens 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 6, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 3, 2014) 
 
___________________ 
 
OPINION 
___________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
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I. 
Laila Rajabi petitions for review of a June 15, 2012 order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (C.A. No. 12-2839) affirming the denial of her application 
for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), and withholding of removal under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture (CAT).
1
 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 
1208.17(a). She also petitions for review of the Board‟s February 4, 2013 order 
denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings (C.A. No. 13-1446). These 
petitions have been consolidated for our review.
2
 For the reasons set forth below, 
both will be denied. 
II. 
 Rajabi, a native and citizen of Iran, entered the United States in 1996 
without proper documentation and was immediately placed in removal 
proceedings. She promptly filed an application for asylum and withholding of 
                                                 
1
  The BIA‟s June 15, 2012 order addressed only Rajabi‟s application for deferral of 
removal under the CAT. Yet the order incorporated by reference a June 25, 2009 
interlocutory decision denying Rajabi‟s applications for asylum and withholding of 
removal under the INA. Thus, the BIA‟s June 15, 2012 order constituted a final order of 
removal, bringing this matter within our appellate jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
2
  The BIA had jurisdiction over Rajabi‟s motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2. This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of the Board, including the 
denial of a motion to reopen, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
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deportation under the INA, which was denied by an immigration judge (“IJ”) on 
July 7, 2000.
3
 Rajabi appealed to the BIA, who remanded the case to the IJ in 
2003, and again in 2005, because tapes were missing from the record. As a result 
of these decisions, Rajabi‟s case was heard de novo before a different IJ in 2007.  
In 2007, Rajabi once again applied for asylum and withholding of removal 
under the INA, and also for protection under the CAT.
4
 Rajabi‟s application stated 
that, beginning in 1995, she was a “student member and a recruiter” for 
Mojahedin-e Khalq (“MEK”), an organization she claimed was purposed on 
“replac[ing] the current regime in Iran with a democratic government” and 
“promot[ing] social welfare.”5 Rajabi asserted that because of her MEK 
                                                 
3
  During the pendency of her removal proceedings, Rajabi met and married her 
husband, a United States citizen from Iran. Rajabi‟s husband filed a petition for an 
adjustment of her status in 1998, and the first IJ to hear her case administratively closed 
the proceedings pending the outcome of that petition, which was denied on the merits in 
1999. This explains the three year gap between the date Rajabi first applied for asylum 
and the IJ‟s denial of her application in 2000. 
4
  Relief under the CAT was not available at the time Rajabi filed her first 
applications for asylum and withholding of removal in 1997. 
5
  Formed in the early 1960s, MEK‟s origins reflect both Marxist and Islamic 
influences. U.S. Dep‟t of State, Iran; Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005. In its early 
days, MEK collaborated with Ayatollah Khomeini in his effort to overthrow the former 
Shah of Iran. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the organization participated in a series of 
terrorist attacks against the interests of the United States. In view of these actions, the 
U.S. Department of State added MEK to its list of designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations in October 1997. That designation, however, was removed in September 
2012, in light of “MEK‟s public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts 
of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the peaceful 
closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base.” Supp. A.R. at 19, Media Note, 
  
 4 
membership she feared being “imprisoned . . . , tortured, raped, and possibly 
killed” if she returned to Iran. Rajabi claimed that her sister—who was the leader 
of several MEK cells and involved with a “small military wing” of the 
organization—was arrested by Iranian police at their parents‟ home in May 1996. 
Rajabi alleged that the authorities searched for her as well, and as a result, she has 
not returned home since the date of her sister‟s arrest. 
Despite the detailed description in her application, Rajabi minimalized her 
involvement with MEK during her hearing before the IJ. She testified that she was 
not actually a member of MEK, explaining that at the time she filed her application 
she was unaware that the group required that an individual be involved for several 
years before it would grant membership. Further, Rajabi claimed that she 
participated in MEK for only about six months, during which time she merely 
distributed pamphlets and assisted several families displaced by the war between 
Iraq and Iran. Rajabi also testified that she did not know that MEK engaged in 
violence until after she came to the United States. 
The IJ denied Rajabi‟s application for asylum and withholding of removal in 
an order dated October 5, 2007. As an initial matter, the IJ found that Rajabi‟s 
testimony was not credible, especially as to the “most crucial parts” related to her 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. Dep‟t of State, Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (Sept. 28, 2012).  
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knowledge of MEK and the extent of her involvement with the organization. He 
noted that Rajabi‟s application “disclosed a more intimate knowledge of the way 
MEK worked and its political objectives and militant capacities” than she 
professed in her oral testimony. He also disbelieved her assertion that she did not 
know about MEK‟s violent activities, particularly considering her sister‟s 
leadership role and Rajabi‟s mention in her application of the organization‟s 
military branch. 
The IJ additionally concluded that Rajabi was statutorily ineligible for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because, by distributing literature 
and recruiting individuals to join MEK, Rajabi had provided material support to a 
Tier III terrorist organization. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd), (vi)(III). 
In determining that MEK was a Tier III terrorist organization, the IJ noted that the 
organization‟s history is marked by anti-Western activity. Indeed, during the 
1970s, MEK‟s members staged terrorist attacks inside Iran, assassinated at least six 
American citizens, supported the takeover of the U.S. Embassy, and opposed the 
release of American hostages. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t 
of State, 182 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting CIA Intelligence Research 
Paper dated July 1993). In light of these actions, the U.S. State Department 
designated MEK as a Tier I terrorist organization in 1997, just months after Rajabi 
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arrived in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I), 1189. Although 
MEK was not listed as a Tier I terrorist organization while Rajabi was offering her 
support, the IJ concluded that, given the organization‟s nefarious past, it was most 
certainly a Tier III terrorist organization before its official designation. 
Despite concluding that Rajabi was statutorily ineligible for withholding of 
removal under the CAT for engaging in terrorist activities, the IJ nonetheless 
granted her deferral of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).
6
 The IJ reasoned that 
because Rajabi would be required to submit her deportation order to Iranian 
authorities, the authorities would be notified about her previous MEK involvement. 
He thus found that “it is more likely than not that upon her arrival [in Iran], 
[Rajabi] will be detained and subjected to torture by the Iranian government.”  
The Department of Homeland Security and Rajabi both appealed to the BIA. 
The Board affirmed the IJ‟s adverse credibility determination and his finding that 
Rajabi was statutorily barred from asylum and withholding of removal as an alien 
who participated in terrorist activities. The BIA, however, vacated the IJ‟s decision 
to grant deferral of removal under the CAT because the IJ‟s order was “unclear as 
                                                 
6
  The IJ purported to grant Rajabi CAT protection under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(a). This 
regulation, however, provides for withholding of removal, a form of relief that is not 
available to aliens who have provided material support to a terrorist organization. The 
BIA, therefore, appropriately understood the immigration judge to have intended to grant 
deferral of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).  
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to what evidence supports the finding of a clear probability of torture and whether 
each „link‟ in the chain of events leading to her torture was demonstrated to be 
more likely than not.”  
On remand, the IJ determined that Rajabi failed to establish that she was 
entitled to deferral of removal under the CAT, in part because she did not provide 
sufficient testimony or other evidence to prove that it was more likely than not that 
the Iranian government would identify her as a political opponent. On June 15, 
2012, the BIA affirmed the IJ‟s decision and dismissed her appeal. Rajabi timely 
petitioned this Court for review.  
While her petition for review was pending, Rajabi filed a motion to reopen 
her removal proceedings based on the fact that the Secretary of State had 
decertified MEK as a Tier I terrorist organization on September 28, 2012. The BIA 
denied the motion to reopen on February 4, 2013. The Board stated that the official 
designation as a terrorist organization does not determine Rajabi‟s removability, 
particularly where her removal was based on a finding that MEK was a Tier III 
terrorist organization at the time of Rajabi‟s participation. Further, the BIA noted 
that Rajabi‟s previous applications for relief were denied on the independent 
ground that her testimony lacked credibility. Rajabi timely petitioned for review of 
the denial of her motion to reopen. The two petitions have been consolidated for 
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our review. 
III. 
We “review the administrative record on which the final removal order is 
based.” Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Where the BIA‟s decision affirms and specifically references the IJ‟s decision, our 
review includes the referenced portions of the IJ‟s decision. Id. “Our review of 
factual findings, including findings [related to] persecution and fear of persecution, 
is for substantial evidence, which means we must uphold findings of fact unless the 
record evidence compels a contrary finding.” Id. (citing Sandie v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009)). We review legal conclusions de novo. Id. 
Rajabi‟s primary contention, with respect to both her motion to reopen and 
her application for asylum and withholding of removal, is that the Secretary of 
State‟s September 2012 decision to delist MEK as a Tier I terrorist organization 
somehow commands a different outcome in her removal proceedings. While the 
decision to remove MEK from the list of Tier I terrorist organizations may reflect 
the United States‟ current perception of the organization, we fail to see how this 
has any bearing on whether MEK was a terrorist organization at the time of 
Rajabi‟s involvement. 
Under our immigration laws, an alien is inadmissible and ineligible for 
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asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief if she “has engaged in a terrorist 
activity,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), which includes committing “an act that 
the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support” to a terrorist 
organization. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc), (dd); see also id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v); 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). The INA defines a “terrorist organization” as a group so 
designated by the Secretary of State (a “Tier I” organization), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I), or as an undesignated group that “engages in, or has a 
subgroup which engages in,” terrorist activity (a “Tier III” organization). Id. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
7
 To be sure, providing material support to a terrorist 
organization—whether Tier I or Tier III—precludes an alien from obtaining 
protection under our immigration laws.  
Although MEK was not designated as a Tier I terrorist organization until 
1997 (just after Rajabi arrived in the United States), the IJ concluded that, given its 
history of violent anti-Western conduct throughout the 1970s and into the 1990s, 
MEK was nonetheless a Tier III organization at the time Rajabi provided material 
                                                 
7
  For our purposes, there is only one distinguishing feature between Tier I and Tier 
III organizations: for undesignated Tier III organizations, the material support bar does 
not apply if the alien “can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [she] did 
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist 
organization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). The IJ concluded that, given MEK‟s 
long history as an organization and her sister‟s leadership role, Rajabi could not 
demonstrate that she should not reasonably have known that MEK was involved in 
terrorist activities. Rajabi does not challenge this finding in her petition for review. 
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support in 1995.
8
 Rajabi, however, contends that she should not be disqualified 
based on her past support of MEK. She argues that the statutory definition for a 
Tier III terrorist organization uses present tense language, and thus the material 
support bar should not apply where the supported organization is no longer 
actively engaged in terrorist conduct.  
Rajabi‟s position finds no support in either the plain language of the statute 
or the statutory context. Importantly, the operative provision of the statute that 
directly addresses an alien‟s eligibility for relief is plainly phrased in the past tense, 
stating that an alien is inadmissible if she “has engaged in a terrorist activity.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). This language is clearly directed both at past conduct 
and ongoing behavior. Our reading is bolstered by the fact that the PATRIOT 
Act—which amended the INA to add restrictions for aliens who previously 
engaged in terrorist activities—includes a retroactivity provision that states that the 
law applies to all “actions taken by an alien before, on, or after [the date of 
enactment].” USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title IV, §§ 
411(c)(1)(A), 115 Stat. 272, 348. Indeed, the authorization of retroactive 
application would have no function if not to reach past conduct. 
The use of the present tense in the definition of a Tier III organization does 
                                                 
8
  Rajabi has not challenged the IJ‟s conclusion that distributing literature and 
recruiting members constitutes “material support.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V). 
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not alter our conclusion. Indeed, that definition includes any “group of two or more 
individuals . . . which engages in [terrorist activity].” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) 
(emphasis added). But here, the term “engages in” refers to the conduct of the 
organization, not the individual alien‟s actions. It describes the acts the 
organization must have undertaken at the time the support was given in order for 
the alien to be deemed inadmissible. There is no basis for concluding this language 
was intended to restrict the application of the INA‟s disqualification provisions to 
aliens actively engaged in ongoing terrorist activities. 
Furthermore, our sister circuits that have considered the issue agree that an 
alien‟s past support to an organization that qualified as a “terrorist organization” at 
the time the support was rendered precludes that individual from relief under our 
immigration laws. See, e.g., Alturo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 716 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th 
Cir. 2013) (“[T]he fact that the AUC was demobilized in 2006 does not render the 
material support bar inapplicable. When Alturo made those payments, the AUC 
was active and designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization . . . .”); Khan v. 
Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f an alien „has engaged in a terrorist 
activity‟ under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) at any time, he is ineligible for both asylum and 
withholding of removal. It does not matter that the alien ceased participation in 
terrorist activity at some point before seeking admission to or relief in the United 
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States.”). Rajabi has not identified any case that holds to the contrary.    
For these reasons, we cannot accept Rajabi‟s argument that the State 
Department‟s decision to delist MEK as a terrorist organization compels a different 
outcome in her quest for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief. The IJ 
appropriately determined that MEK was a Tier III terrorist organization at the time 
of Rajabi‟s involvement in 1995. Also, the IJ did not err when he concluded that, 
by providing material support to MEK at that time, Rajabi is ineligible for 
protection under United States immigration laws. Rajabi‟s consolidated petitions 
for review will be denied.  
 
 
